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Abstract 
This paper investigates institutional factors affecting the performance of genuine 
savings (GS), which is often used in assessing sustainable development, adopting a 
model of autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity in mean. We pay particular 
attention to the contribution of institutions to decrease the volaticility level of the GS 
path. Using GS data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, and  
institutional data in the International Country Risk Guide, the estimation results show 
that there are two ways, through which institutions affecting GS performance. First, the 
high quality of the institutions enhance GS level directly. Second, the high quality of 
institutions enhance the GS level via stabilizing the volatiligy of the GS path. 
Considering both effect in their totality, institutional improvement plays an important 
role in realizing a sustainable development path. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the economic ideas for assessing the sustainability of development is to 
observe “genuine savings (hereinafter, GS).” The GS concept, first proposed by Pearce 
and Atkinson (1993), is a “capital approach” that captures the depletion of capital stock, 
usually overlooked in the GDP.
1
 This concept is useful for capturing economic and 
environmental variations in total terms. Various empirical applications using the GS 
indicator has been utilized in prominent studies, such as that of Hamilton and Atkinson 
(2006). The GS-based sustainability condition is conceptually based on the definition 
found in the Brundtland report (World Commission, 1987) and can be simplified as  
“non-declining well-being for the future”(Arrow et al., 2003). Based on this definition, 
a development is judged to be sustainable if and only if its productive base, which is the 
source of well-being, is maintained at all times. This producive base called “inclusive 
wealth” includes not only man-made capital but also all possible sources of human 
well-being, such as human capital and natural capital. The maintainance of this 
inclusive wealth implies that a future generation will be to realize at least the same level 
of well-being compared to that experienced by the current generation.
2
 
During the past several decades, many studies have applied this indicator when 
examining a country’s sustainability (see Hamilton and Clemens, 1999; Arrow et al., 
2004, etc.). However, there is little discussion on the shape of the path, namely what 
kind of GS path is more desirable than another. Figure 1 demonstrates that there are 
                                                 
1
 This concept is classified as “weak sustainability,” which admits there is sustitutability among the 
different capitals. For details on strong and weak sustainability, see Neumayer (2000). 
2
 In researches related to GS studies, the change of inclusive stock is purposefully addressed using  
different terminologies, such as “inclusive investment” (Dasgupta, 2007) and “adjusted net savings” 
(World Bank). A recent research project developed the inclusive wealth index and stressed the 
difference between this concept and GS in its theoretical assumptions and empirical techniques (see 
UNU-IHDP and UNEP, 2012). In this paper, we focus on the GS path and utilize the data from  the 
World Bank due to its data richness. 
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various shapes of the GS path, as provided from GS data in the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (WDI) used in the previous studies. 
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the average GS level, the paths of actual value, and a Hodrick–
Prescott(HP) filter-based smoothed value for GS. The average value of GS has typically 
been used to judge the sustainability of a country in many of the previous studies, such 
as Hamilton and Clemens (1999) and Arrow et al. (2004). However, as Figure 1 shows, 
for some countries, the shapes of their GS paths are quite different although their GS 
averages are indeed very similar. For example, the GS in Albania, the United States, and 
the United Kingdom shows a similar average, but its shapes are quite different. While 
the United Kingdom’s GS is very stable, Albania’s GS is quite volatile and experiences 
negative value. Another remarkable difference is that China’s GS is more volatile than 
that for Japan and Sweden. Figure 1 also shows the future risk in 50 years of violating 
the condition of sustainable development (GS≥0), calculated in Sato et al. (2012), 
except for Albania.
3
 The probabilities of experiencing a negative GS value are quite 
diffent in the selected countries. This difference implies that even if GS averages are 
almost the same, the evaluation of sustainability may be different in different countries. 
Given the above discussion, judging sustainability in a country should not be based 
only on the average value of GS. On this point,volatility has become an important issue 
in terms of economic growth and development. Many studies on whether volatility is 
                                                 
3
 Based on a simulation, Sato et al. (2012) calculate the probability that the GS in a country will 
experience negative value in 50 years. 
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good for growth or not are available. On the one hand, studies like Mirman (1971) 
suggest that volatility can boost growth through precautionary savings. On the other 
hand, studies like Bernanke (1983) have shown that growth volatility produces a lower 
growth rate over time. In a recent study that considers both potential effects of volatility, 
van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2009) find that the financial sector plays an important 
role in alleviating the baneful effect of volatility in resource- exporting countries. 
It is likely that GS volatility is also important in the study of sustainable 
development when we define sustainable development as non-negative GS for all points 
of time, as volatility may increase the risk of experincing negative GS. As indicated by 
Arrow et al. (2003), the shape of a GS path is considerd to be determined by a “resource 
allocation mechanism.” A stable and non-negative GS should be realized if the 
allocation mechanism works well and the established policy for sustainable 
development is properly conducted. If the allocation is failing, however, the wealth in 
the noted country is seriously impacted, and the performance of GS will significantly 
deteriorate. From this analysis , it is reasonable to consider that the determinants of a 
stable path of GS in each  country may depend on its individual institutional factors 
that affect resource management.  
There are also researches available on the relationship between institutions and the 
volatility of an economic growth path. Acemogulu et al. (2003) hyphothesized and 
provided evidence that shows that weak institutions will lead to a high volatility of 
growth. Yang (2008) finds that by taking into account ethnic diversity, democracy 
lowers growth volatility in heterogeneous ethnic countries. These factors can also be 
considered important in the context of sustainable development. In this regard, Dietz et 
al. (2007) analyse the linkage between GS level and corruption, but they do not 
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consider the GS volatility effect. However, based on the above discussion, it is expected 
that the effects of volatility may also be important in the context of GS.In a recent study 
on GS volatility, Sato et al. (2012) calculate the volatility of GS based on time-series 
data and conduct a simulation to calculate the probability of experiencing a negative GS 
value within 50 years in various countries. The results show that even if their GS 
averages are similar, countries whose GS paths are relatively volatile tend to have a 
higher probability of experiencing a negative GS value, thus suggeseting a violation of 
the GS-based sustainability condition. However, Sato et al. (2012) did not investigate 
the specific factors that affects GS volatility. 
From this discussion, it appears that to analyze sustainable development 
appropriately using the GS indicator, it is also important to take GS volatility  into 
account. Moreover, it is reasonably clear that GS volatility may be affected by the 
institutions in each country. In this paper, we simultaneously examine the effect of 
institutions on GS volatility and the impact of volatility on GS performance using the 
panel data from 63 countries. We adopt the autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity 
in mean (ARCH-M) as our estimation methodology. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the 
estimation methodology; Section 3 explains the data used for the estimation; Section 4 
provides the estimation results and discussion; and Section 5 presents concluding 
remarks.   
 
2. Estimation Methodology 
As already discussed, this paper defines sustainable development as non-declinig 
inclusive wealth, represented by W in Equation (1) 
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W
t
= KM
t
+ KH
t
+ KN
t
,                         (1) 
 
where KMt is manmade capital, KHt is human capital, and KNt is natural capital, all of 
which are evaluated by their accounting prices (shadow prices).
4
 The time 
differentiation for W is called genuine savings (GS), and the sustainability condition 
requires that GS is always non-negative as follows: 
 
GSt ≡
dWt
dt
=
dKM t
dt
+
dKH t
dt
+
dKNt
dt
≥ 0,     for all t                  (2) 
 
To investigate the relationships among institutions, GS, and its volatility, we follow 
the estimation framework adopted by Ramey and Ramey (1995) and van der Ploeg and 
Poelhekke (2009). They apply the ARCH-M methodology developed by Engel et al. 
(1987). The ARCH-M model is a modification of the ARCH model suggested by Engle 
(1982). It incorporates the variance in the mean equation. The mean and variance 
equations are then constructed as follows: 
 
2
1 1log( ) cit it it it itGS M Xβ σ β ϕ ε= + + + + ,         (3) 
εit ~ N (0,σ it
2 ) ,              (4) 
σ it
2 = exp(c2 + Xitκ + Zitγ )+φ1σ t−1
2 +φ2σ t−2
2 +ηit ,               (5) 
                                                 
4
 Dasgupta (2004) also includes knowledge capital in equation (1). However, as mentioned in 
Section 3, our data do not include knowledge capital due to the fact that the available database for 
GS is based on only three types of capital (manmade capital, human capital, and natural capital) in 
equation (1). 
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where GSit represents the transformed genuine savings in country i. Since the original 
value of genuine savings can have a non-positive value, it is transformed as shown 
below to be able to take a logarithm. 
 
GSit = gsit +1,                            (6) 
 
where gsit is the original data of genuine savings in country i.σ2 is the variace of 
genuine savings, reflecting volatility, and t is the time index. M is the vector of control 
variables, which appear only in the mean equation (3). It contains age dependency 
(age_dep) and the urban population rate in total population (urban). X is the vector of 
the variables, which are expected to have impacts on both GS and its volatility. For 
these variables, we mainly focus on institutions (institution). Moreover, X includes other 
variables, such as per capita GDP growth (ggdp), inflation rate (inflation), trade 
openness (trade), and government size (gov_size), proxied by the share of government 
expenditures in the GDP. These variables are chosen following Dietz et al. (2007). Z is a 
vector representing a set of variables that only have an impact on GS variance and 
contains the square of per capita GDP growth (ggdp
2
). Therefore, they are included only 
in equation (5). These variables affect GS indirectly through its variance. 
In sum, in this paper, institutions are assumed to affect GS through two channels. 
First, higher-quality institutions may contribute to proper resource allocation. This  
allocation results in a higher GS performance (by the same token, lower-quality 
institutions may result in a lower GS). Secondly, higher-quality institutions may help to 
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stabilize a development path, which would imply that if the coefficient of volatility, β1, 
is negative, then a decrease in volatility may contribute to a higher level of GS value. 
Figure 2 illustrates the effect of institutions on GS. 
 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
We also include two regional dummies, a Middle East/North Africa dummy 
(region_dummy1) and a sub-Saharan African dummy (region_dummy2), in both the 
mean and variance equations.
5
 The rationales underlying this inclusion are the 
following. Incorporating the world’s resource-rich region, the Middle East/North Africa 
dummy, allows us to observe how the specific characteristics of this region impact GS 
performance. For sub-Saharan Africa, since this region has generally suffered from a 
slow economic growth over recent decades, it is natural to consider that the 
performance of capital accumulation is relatively poor in the region. Therefore, its 
dummy variable is incoporated to control for this specific characterestic. 
From the discussion noted above, the mean and viariace estimation equations for 
our ARCH-M model can be rewritten as 
 
2
, 1 1 1 , 2 i,t 3 , 4 ,
5 , 6 , 7 ,
8 i,t 9
10 1 ,
log( ) + ggdp _
gov_size _ 1
_ 2
i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t
i t
GS c age dep urban
institutions inflation trade
rgion dummy
region dummy
β σ β β β
β β β
β β
β ε
= + + +
+ + +
+ +
+ +
           (7) 
εit ~ N (0,σ it
2 )                                 (8) 
                                                 
5
 Region specification is based on the World Bank’s classification. 
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2 2
1 , 2 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 ,
5 , 6 , 7
2 2
8 1 1 , 1 2 1 , 2 1 ,
exp(
_ _ 1
_ 2)
i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t
i t i t i t
c ggdp ggdp institutions inflation
trade gov size region dummy
region dummy
σ γ γ γ γ
γ γ γ
γ φ σ φ σ η− −
= + + + +
+ + +
+ + + +
         (9) 
. 
As discussed in Section 1, the main purpose of this paper is to confirm whether or 
not the GS value in the LHS of the mean equation (7) is negatively affected by its own 
volatility (variance). As economic growth indicates an increase in investment resources, 
it is natural to anticipate that economic growth also contributes to the accumulation of a 
productive base, leading, therefore, to the expectation that the sign of per capita GDP 
growth in the mean equation (7) is positive (β2>0). However, highly rapid economic 
growth may cause GS volatility. Hence, the expected sign for the square of per capita 
GDP growth in the variance equation (9) is expected to be positive (γ2>0). For trade 
openness, it may or may not contribute to an increase in the GS level itself, but it is 
certainly a source of GS volatility, as discussed in van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2009). 
Therefore, its expected sign in the variance equation is positive (γ5>0). Government size 
also may or may not have a positive impact on GS level, but it is expected to help 
stabilize the development path due to the basic “stabilizing function” of the government. 
Therefore, the expected sign of its estimated coefficient in the variance equation is 
negative (γ6<0). The signs of the estimated coefficients of age dependency,urban 
population rate, andinflation are expected to be negative in the mean equation (7) (β3<0,  
β4<0, and β6<0). In the variance equation (9), the sign of inflation is expected to be 
positive (γ4>0).  
Finally, and most importantly, the institutional variables are expected to contribute 
to an increase in GS and a decrease in GS volatility. This finding implies that the sign of 
an institutional variable is expected to be positive in the mean equation (7) (β5>0) and 
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negative in a variance equation (9) (γ3<0). For a resource-abundant region, such as the 
oil exporting countries of Middle East/North Africa, the sign of its estimated coefficient 
(β9) in the mean equation (7) can be either negative or positive, depending on how the 
countries in the region manage their rich resources. If the revenue earned from resource 
exporting is sufficiently invested in other capital (man-made or human capital) stocks  
to compensat to the depletion of natural capital, β9 is expected to be positive. Otherwise, 
it is expected to be negative. As for the estimated coefficient for the Middle East/North 
Africa regional dummy (γ7) in a variance equation (9), its sign is expected to be positive 
if the resources are indiscriminately exploited and negative if they are 
appropriatelyextracted.  
For the sub-Saharan African dummy, as mentioned above, it is included to capture 
that region’s slow economic growth over recent decades. This poor growth performance 
may have a negative impact on capital accumulation. Therefore, the signs of its 
estimated coefficients are expected to be negative in the mean equation (β10<0) and 
positive in the variance equation (γ8>0), respectively. 
To examine how institutional factors affect the impacts of trade openess and 
government size on GS performance, the interaction terms between trade openess and 
institutions and between government size and institutions are added to the estimation 
equations. Furthermore, the interaction terms between per capita GDP and institutions 
are also taken into account for investigating how institutions affect GS performance, 
given different levels of development. The mean and variance equations with each 
interaction term can thus be written as follows. 
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2
, 3 11 2 , 12 i,t 13 , 14 ,
15 , 16 , 17 ,
18 i,t 19 i,t
20 21 1 ,
log( ) + ggdp _
gov_size ( )*( )
_ 1 _ 2
i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t
i t
GS c age dep urban
institutions inflation trade
W institutions
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β σ β β β
β β β
β β
β β ε
= + + +
+ + +
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        (10) 
εit ~ N (0,σ it
2 )                          (11) 
2 2
2 , 4 9 , 10 , 11 , 12 ,
13 , 14 , 15 i,t
16 17
2 2
3 2 , 1 4 2 , 2 1 ,
exp(
_ ( )*( )
_ 1 _ 2)
i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t
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γ γ γ
γ γ
φ σ φ σ η− −
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+ + +
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+ + +
    (12) 
where W is per capita GDP, trade openess, or government expenditures. 
 
3. Data 
The GS data for our study are taken from World Development Indicators (WDI) 
(2010) released by the World Bank.
6
 It is worth noting that, as stressed by van der 
Ploeg (2011), the World Bank’s “adjusted net savings (ANS)” possibly overestimates 
genuine savings, especially in resource-rich countries. However, we employ WDI’s 
ANS data as the GS for our analysis, given the fact that it is the most reliable and 
available data source. 
WDI provides GS data calculated by three types of capital: The sum of manmade 
capital investment (net national savings; 
dKM t
dt
), human capital investment (education 
expenditures; 
dKH t
dt
), and degradation of natural resources (energy depletion, mineral 
depletion, forest depletion, and CO2 emissions; 
dKNt
dt
). Other variables, such as 
economic growth per capita, urban population rate, age dependency, inflation rate, trade, 
                                                 
6
 Available at http://databank.worldbank.org/ 
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and government expenditure, are also taken from the WDI (2010).   
With respect to institutional variables, the data were obtained from the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) provided by the Political Risk Service. The 
12 institutional variables of ICRG employed for our analysis include: (1) Bureaucracy 
Quality, (2) Corruption, (3) Democratic Accountability, (4) Ethnic Tension, (5) External 
Conflict, (6) Government Stability, (7) Internal Conflict, (8) Investment Profile, (9) Law 
and Order, (10) Military in Politics, (11) Religious Tension, and (12) Socio-economic 
Condition. Appendix B provides a brief explanation of these institutional variables. 
    A summary of the definitions of the variables used and their data sources is 
provided in Table A1 in Appendix A. Sixty-three countries were utilized for the analysis 
as a balanced panel. The country list is provided in Table A2 in Appendix A. Following 
Busse and Hefeker (2007), we introduce institutional variables into econometric models 
one by one to avoid the multicolinearity problem, since these variables are strongly 
related to each other as shown in the correlation matrix in Table 1. 
Using the above two databases, we set up a dataset for analysis. The sample period 
for our analysis runs from 1984 to 2008 based on the data availability of all the 
variables in our study. 
 
[Table 1 here ] 
 
4. Estimation Results and Discussion 
We adopted the ARCH-M model for our estimation, in which the mean equations 
(7) and (10) and the variance equations (9) and (12) are simultaneously estimated. Table 
2 shows the estimation results for four instituion variables, namely, Bureaucracy Quality, 
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Corruption, Democratic Accountability, and Law and Order.
7
 Columns (1) to (16) 
illustrate the results for these four institutional variables as follows: Columns (1) to (4) 
for Bureaucracy Quality; columns (5) to (8) for Corruption; columns (9) to (12) for 
Democratic Accountability; and columns (13) to (16) for Law and Order 
. 
[Table 2 here] 
 
From the table, most of the coefficients for the variables in consideration are 
statistically significant and have correct signs. Specifically, all the estimated coefficients 
of GS volatility (σ2) in the mean equations (7) and (10) are significantly negative. As 
expected, most of the institutional variables have significantly positive impacts on GS 
value. Specifically, for institutional variables, such as bureaucracy quality, corruption, 
democratic accountability, and law and order, we confirm that they have two-way 
impacts on sustainable development. One is a direct effect on the mean equations (7) 
and (10); the other via stabilization of GS volatility in the variance equations (9) and 
(12). This finding could be interpreted as their contributing to the stabilization of GS 
volatility. In sum, our ARCH-M estimation provides sufficient evidence to support the 
finding that the quality ofinstitutions plays an important role in improving and 
stabilizing sustainable development. The total effects of institutions on GS performance 
can be calculated based on their indirect effects in the variace equations and their direct 
effects in the mean equation. Using the country average of required variables for 2008, 
the total effects of corruption, for example, are calculated as 0.0035. It is noteworthy 
                                                 
7
 Only the results for these four institutional variables are reported in Table 2 to save space. For the 
results for the other eight institutional variables, see Table C1 in Appendix C.  
 14
also that the total effect for genuine savings is larger than the direct effect of 
improvement of corruption, thus reflecting the stabilization of the GS-development 
path.
8
 
The estimation results in Table 2 further indicate that an increase in age 
dependency (age_dep) and urban population rate (urban) leads to a lower GS level. 
From columns (1), (5), (9), and (13), trade openness (trade) could increase the GS level, 
but that factor also has an indirect effect on causing GS volatility. The total effects can 
be calculated in the same way as the case of institution. For example, the total effect of 
trade openness is 0.033 for the case of corruption.
9
 It is also noteworthy that the total 
effect of trade openness is smaller than its direct effect, thus reflecting a volatilizing 
GS-development path. This finding means that it is an overestimation if onlyfocusing on 
the direct effect of trade openness. 
To examine how institutions affect the impact of trade on GS, we incorporate the 
interaction term between trade and institutions into the estimation equations. These 
results are shown in columns (3), (7), (11), and (15).The results in the mean equation 
show that, for countries with a low level of institutional quality, the effects of 
institutions on the increasing impact of trade on the GS level is relatively large. This 
finding indicates the importance of  institutional imrovement on enhancing the direct 
impact of trade on the GS level, especially in countries with a poor quality of 
                                                 
8
 This is caluculated from (7) and (9) as 
2 3
1 3 5
log c X ZGS
e
X
γ γβ γ β+ +
∂
= +
∂
 
where X is institutional variables, i.e., corruption;β5 is a direct effect, i.e., the coefficient of 
institutions in the mean regression;γ is a coeffiient vector, (γ1, γ2, γ4, γ5, γ6, γ7, γ8); Z is the variable 
vector, (ggdp, ggdp
2
, inflation, trade, gov_size, region_dummy1, region_dummy2)
’
. For other 
institutional variables, we can calculate in a similar procedure.  
9
 Although there are 12 institutional variables, we selected one institutional variable when 
calculating the total effect of control variables. We also calculate the total effect of trade openness 
for other 11 institutional variables and find that the total effect is smaller than its direct effect. 
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institutions. Furthermore, the results for the variance equation show that although trade 
leads to the volatility of GS, a better quality of institutions helps to reduce this volatility. 
Therefore, an improvement of institutions reduces the negative indirect impact of trade 
on the GS level. 
For government expenditures (gov_size), , the results in columns (5), (9), and (13) 
show that it helps to improve the GS performance from the results of the mean equation. 
In the variance equation, however, it seems to have an effect on stabilizing the GS 
volatility in column (1). In general, compared to other variables, government 
expenditures show an ambiguous effect on GS. Given these results, the impact of 
government size may depend on the type of the government. A more profound 
investigation on the effect of government size will be the subject for future research. For 
columns (2), (6), (10), and (14) where the interaction terms between per capita GDP and 
institutions are included, in the mean equation, the results indicate that the effects of 
institutions on GS level is relatively high at the lower level of per capital GDP. This 
finding implies that in countries with a lower level of development, institutions have 
higher impacts on GS level. From the variace equation in the same columns, the results 
show that insitutional quality helps stabilize the GS volatility, and the stbilization effect 
is stronger in a country with a higher level of development. These results should not be 
surprising, given the fact that countries with a higher level of development have more 
efficient governments.  
Regarding the effect of per capita GDP growth rate on GS volatility, from the 
estimation results in the variance equation, the estimated coefficients of per capita GDP 
growth rate are significantly negative, while the estimated coefficients of their squared 
terms are significantly positive. This result indicates the U-shaped effect of economic 
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growth on GS volatility, implying the existence of a turning point for this effect. We 
report this turning-point level for per capita GDP growth rate in Table 2. The growth 
rate below (above) this turning point has a negative (positive) impact on GS volatility. 
However, because the turning point is generally very high, and given the fact that the 
average growth rate of an economy rarely exceeds 10 percent, we can conclude the 
reduction impact of growth rate on GS volatility from our findings. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
Using the autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity in the mean (ARCH-M) 
model, this paper investigates two effects of institutional quality on GS performance. 
One is a direct effect, and the other is an indirect effect determined through a volatility 
channel. From the estimatedion results, we find that GS volatility could depress GS 
performance. This finding implies that the previous studies that focus only on the direct 
effect could be an over- or under-evaluation of sustainability. It is important to take into 
account the stability of the GS development path. On this point, our study focuses on 
the role of institutions as factors that affect the shape of the development path. 
Therefore, we examine whether institutional variables do affect the volatility of the GS 
path. Our results show that better institutions overall contribute not only to improving 
GS performance but also to stabilizing its volatility. In other words, a high quality of 
institutions directly boosts GS level and indirectly contributes to GS performance via 
volatility stabilization. It is often argued herein that proper institutional quality is 
needed for sustainable development. In this paper, we provide actual quantitative 
evidence that supports this argument.  
Our findings suggest that judging sustainable development in a country based only 
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on a GS average is insufficient. It is necessary to judge the GS path as a whole from a 
broader viewpoint that includes institutional factors or other significant factors that  
affect GS or the volatility of its path. In reality, the shapes of a GS path are quite 
different from country to country, and its volatility is certainly important in addressing 
such differences. In this paper, we provide a research framework that takes into account 
institutional factors as a main source of that volatility and thus assesses sustainability 
more precisely. It is worth noting as well that the performance of institutions is difficult 
to measure. At present, the twelve institutional variables published by ICRG, which are 
used in this paper, appear to be the best available dataset. However, when better 
institutional variables are available, the future research on sustainability using them will 
be worth conducting.
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Appendix A 
 
Table A1: Variable definition and data source 
Variable Definition Data Source 
I. Dependent Variable   
Genuine savings (GS) The share of “Adjusted Net Savings” in GNI. World Development Indicators (2010) 
II. Independent Variable   
Per capita GDP growth rate (ggdp)
* 
The annual growth rate of per capita GDP. World Development Indicators (2010) 
Age dependency (age_dep) 
The share of dependents (people younger than 15 or older than 64) to the 
working-age population (people ages 15-64) 
World Development Indicators (2010) 
Urban population rate (urban) 
The share of urban population in total population. The data of urban 
population and total population for calculating this rate is drawn from World 
Development Indicators (2010). 
World Development Indicators (2010) 
Inflation rate (inflation)
* 
The annual rate of inflation calculated from GDP deflator. World Development Indicators (2010) 
Trade openness (trade)
* 
The share of the sum of export and import of goods and services in GDP. World Development Indicators (2010) 
Government Expenditure (gov_size)
* 
The share of general government final consumption expenditure in GDP. World Development Indicators (2010) 
Institutional variables
*
:   
    (1) Bureaucracy Quality Score: 0 (lowest) to 4 (highest) International Country Risk Guide (2009) 
    (2) Corruption Score: 0 (lowest) to 6 (highest) International Country Risk Guide (2009) 
    (3) Democratic Accountability Score: 0 (lowest) to 6 (highest) International Country Risk Guide (2009) 
    (4) Ethnic Tension Score: 0 (lowest) to 6 (highest) International Country Risk Guide (2009) 
    (5) External Conflict Score: 0 (lowest) to 12 (highest) International Country Risk Guide (2009) 
    (6) Government Stability Score: 0 (lowest) to 12 (highest) International Country Risk Guide (2009) 
    (7) Internal Conflict Score: 0 (lowest) to 12 (highest) International Country Risk Guide (2009) 
    (8) Investment Profile Score: 0 (lowest) to 12 (highest) International Country Risk Guide (2009) 
    (9) Law and Order Score: 0 (lowest) to 6 (highest) International Country Risk Guide (2009) 
    (10) Military in Politics Score: 0 (lowest) to 6 (highest) International Country Risk Guide (2009) 
    (11) Religious Tension Score: 0 (lowest) to 6 (highest) International Country Risk Guide (2009) 
    (12) Socio-economic Condition Score: 0 (lowest) to 12 (highest) International Country Risk Guide (2009) 
Note: “*” indicates the variables that are included in both mean and variance equation in ARCH-M model. 
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Table A2: List of countries 
1. Albania 33. Jordan 
2. Australia 34. Kenya 
3. Austria 35. Mexico 
4. Bahrain 36. Morocco 
5. Bangladesh 37. Netherlands 
6. Bolivia 38. Norway 
7. Brazil 39. Pakistan 
8. Bulgaria 40. Panama 
9. Canada 41. Papua New Guinea 
10. Chile 42. Paraguay 
11. China 43. Peru 
12. Congo, DR 44. Philippines 
13. Costa Rica 45. Portugal 
14. Cote d'Ivoire 46. Saudi Arabia 
15. Denmark 47. South Africa 
16. Dominican Republic 48. South Korea 
17. Ecuador 49. Spain 
18. Egypt 50. Sri Lanka 
19. Finland 51. Sudan 
20. France 52. Sweden 
21. Gabon 53. Syria 
22. Ghana 54. Thailand 
23. Greece 55. Trinidad and Tobago 
24. Guatemala 56. Tunisia 
25. Honduras 57. Turkey 
26. Hungary 58. Uganda 
27. India 59. United Kingdom 
28. Indonesia 60. United States 
29. Ireland 61. Uruguay 
30. Israel 62. Venezuela 
31. Italy 63. Zambia 
32. Japan     
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Appendix B 
Explanation of institutional variables: 
(See http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx for more detailed explanation) 
 
(1) Bureaucracy Quality relates the institutional strength and quality of bureaucracy. 
High score on this indicator implies the high autonomy of bureaucracy from 
political pressure and its strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in 
policy or interruptions in government services. 
(2) Corruption causes distortion in economic and financial environments. It also reduces 
the efficiency of government and business and causes instability in the political 
process. Less corrupt countries receive a high score. 
(3) Democratic Accountability expresses how responsive government is to its people. A 
high score means that the government type of the country is highly responsive.  
(4) Ethnic Tension assesses the degree of tension within a country attributable to racial, 
nationality, or language divisions. A high score on this indicator means that the 
tensions are minimal, even though such differences still exist. 
(5) External Conflict is the measure of the risk to the incumbent government from 
foreign action. Countries with low risk receive a high score.  
(6) Government Stability is the assessment of the government’s ability to carry out its 
declared programs and to stay in office. Countries with a strong government receive 
a high score. 
(7) Internal Conflict assesses the political violence in the country and its actual or 
potential impact on governance. Countries receive a high score when there is no 
armed or civil opposition to the government and the government does not indulge in 
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arbitrary violence against its own people. 
(8) Investment Profile assesses the risks of investment that are not covered by other 
political, economic and financial risk components, such as contract viability, profits 
repatriation and payment delays. A high score means low risks. 
(9) Law and Order assesses both the strength and impartiality of the legal system and 
popular observance of the law. Countries with a well-working judicial system 
receive a high score. 
(10) Military in Politics reports the degree to which the military, which is not elected, 
participates in government. The military in government tends to produce some kinds 
of risk in the long run. Low ratings indicate a greater degree of military participation 
in politics and a higher level of political risk. 
(11) Religious tension may be caused by the domination of society and/or governance 
by a single religious group that seeks to replace civil law with religious law and to 
exclude other religions from the political and/or social process. A high score means 
a low tension. 
(12) Socio-economic condition assesses the pressures at work in society that could 
constrain government action or fuel social dissatisfaction relating to unemployment, 
consumer confidence and poverty. A high score means that the society is free from 
such pressures. 
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Appendix C 
 
Table C1: GS and its volatility (ARCH-M estimation) 
Dependent variable: log(GS) 
Sample period: Ethnic Ethnic Ethnic Ethnic 
1984-2008 Tension Tension Tension Tension 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
GS volatility (σ2) -0.9021*** -0.8402*** -0.8315*** -0.8796*** 
 
(0.2583) (0.2701) (0.2517) (0.2717) 
Per capita GDP growth rate (ggdp) 0.2029*** 0.2089*** 0.2181*** 0.2128*** 
 
(0.0219) (0.0227) (0.0223) (0.0212) 
Age dependency (age_dep) -0.0931*** -0.0869*** -0.0912*** -0.0915*** 
 
(0.0080) (0.0087) (0.0075) (0.0081) 
Urban population rate (urban) -0.1241*** -0.1269*** -0.1172*** -0.1206*** 
 
(0.0048) (0.0050) (0.0046) (0.0048) 
Institutional factors (institution) 0.0011* 0.0010 -0.0046*** -0.0008 
 
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0013) (0.0017) 
Inflation rate (inflation) -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Trade openness (trade) 0.0408*** 0.0374*** -0.0059 0.0410*** 
 
(0.0024) (0.0022) (0.0108) (0.0024) 
Government expenditure (gov_size) 0.1683*** 0.1427*** 0.1717*** 0.1067** 
 
(0.0186) (0.0203) (0.0179) (0.0525) 
(Per capita GDP)*(institutional factors) 
 
0.0001*** 
  
  
(0.0000) 
  
(Trade openness)*(institutional factors) 
  
0.0097*** 
 
   
(0.0022) 
 
(Government expenditure)*(institutional factors) 
   
0.0126 
    
(0.0109) 
Middle East/North Africa dummy 0.0090** 0.0123*** 0.0119*** 0.0113*** 
 
(0.0041) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0043) 
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy -0.0636*** -0.0628*** -0.0608*** -0.0638*** 
 
(0.0042) (0.0045) (0.0042) (0.0043) 
Constant 0.1813*** 0.1813*** 0.2005*** 0.1867*** 
  (0.0082) (0.0081) (0.0093) (0.0098) 
Variance equation         
Per capita GDP growth rate (ggdp) -11.7917*** -11.7450*** -12.3234*** -11.7651*** 
 
(1.4828) (1.3321) (1.4588) (1.4345) 
Square of per capita GDP growth rate (ggdp2) 58.6792*** 30.7052*** 57.8190*** 36.5273*** 
 
(8.6801) (10.7640) (8.7162) (9.9001) 
Institutional factors (institution) -0.2414*** -0.1598*** -0.1026 -0.2078* 
 
(0.0376) (0.0451) (0.0993) (0.1072) 
Inflation rate (inflation) -0.0051 -0.0008 -0.0041 -0.0030 
 
(0.0571) (0.0420) (0.0547) (0.0466) 
Trade openness (trade) 1.5789*** 1.5880*** 2.4629*** 1.5633*** 
 
(0.1740) (0.1867) (0.6915) (0.1744) 
Government expenditure (gov_size) -4.6019*** -1.4393 -4.9225*** -3.6446 
 
(1.1606) (1.3784) (1.2481) (2.9059) 
(Per capita GDP)*(institutional factors) 
 
-0.0068*** 
  
  
(0.0014) 
  
(Trade openness)*(institutional factors) 
  
-0.2123 
 
   
(0.1461) 
 
(Government expenditure)*(institutional factors) 
   
-0.2879 
    
(0.6404) 
Middle East/North Africa dummy 0.6274*** 0.2058 0.6529*** 0.6074*** 
 
(0.2139) (0.2544) (0.2273) (0.2135) 
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy 0.8938*** 0.7440*** 0.9080*** 0.8602*** 
 
(0.2293) (0.2299) (0.2306) (0.2330) 
Constant -7.2036*** -7.5616*** -7.7041*** -7.2461*** 
 
(0.2791) (0.2943) (0.4636) (0.4706) 
σt-1
2 0.9282*** 0.9362*** 0.9392*** 0.9213*** 
 
(0.0696) (0.0719) (0.0701) (0.0701) 
σt-2
2 0.0514** 0.0530** 0.0359 0.0591** 
  (0.0253) (0.0247) (0.0231) (0.0265) 
Log likelihood 2562.613 2567.464 2570.428 2560.961 
Turning point of growth 10.05% 19.13% 10.66% 16.10% 
Number of observations 1575.0000 1575.0000 1575.0000 1575.0000 
Notes: 
1. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
2. The asterisks ***, **, and * are 1%, 5%, and 10% of significance levels, respectively. 
 23
Table C1 (continued): GS and its volatility (ARCH-M estimation) 
Dependent variable: log(GS) 
Sample period: External External External External 
1984-2008 Conflict Conflict Conflict Conflict 
Independent variables (5) (6) (7) (8) 
GS volatility (σ2) -0.9431*** -0.8142*** -1.0270*** -0.9598*** 
 
(0.2570) (0.2617) (0.2640) (0.2476) 
Per capita GDP growth rate (ggdp) 0.2269*** 0.2123*** 0.2185*** 0.2061*** 
 
(0.0217) (0.0215) (0.0215) (0.0220) 
Age dependency (age_dep) -0.0918*** -0.0926*** -0.0966*** -0.0945*** 
 
(0.0078) (0.0090) (0.0079) (0.0077) 
Urban population rate (urban) -0.1227*** -0.1024*** -0.1269*** -0.1293*** 
 
(0.0038) (0.0056) (0.0036) (0.0036) 
Institutional factors (institution) 0.0006 0.0014*** 0.0034*** 0.0031*** 
 
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0011) 
Inflation rate (inflation) -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Trade openness (trade) 0.0393*** 0.0400*** 0.0970*** 0.0410*** 
 
(0.0024) (0.0022) (0.0174) (0.0025) 
Government expenditure (gov_size) 0.1764*** 0.1916*** 0.1818*** 0.3673*** 
 
(0.0188) (0.0217) (0.0190) (0.0709) 
(Per capita GDP)*(institutional factors) 
 
-0.0000*** 
  
  
(0.0000) 
  
(Trade openness)*(institutional factors) 
  
-0.0054*** 
 
   
(0.0015) 
 
(Government expenditure)*(institutional factors) 
   
-0.0173*** 
    
(0.0065) 
Middle East/North Africa dummy 0.0126*** 0.0084* 0.0082* 0.0031 
 
(0.0042) (0.0044) (0.0043) (0.0044) 
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy -0.0589*** -0.0633*** -0.0579*** -0.0584*** 
 
(0.0042) (0.0044) (0.0042) (0.0040) 
Constant 0.1770*** 0.1616*** 0.1537*** 0.1551*** 
  (0.0089) (0.0090) (0.0122) (0.0137) 
Variance equation         
Per capita GDP growth rate (ggdp) -10.8880*** -9.1030*** -11.0682*** -12.5388*** 
 
(1.4540) (1.3876) (1.5410) (1.6525) 
Square of per capita GDP growth rate (ggdp2) 64.3870*** 35.5478*** 63.5839*** 63.2333*** 
 
(8.8507) (10.0139) (8.9765) (6.6542) 
Institutional factors (institution) -0.1446*** -0.0603 -0.1389* -0.2933** 
 
(0.0390) (0.0386) (0.0842) (0.1275) 
Inflation rate (inflation) 0.0007 0.0044 0.0007 0.0001 
 
(0.0393) (0.0282) (0.0392) (0.0451) 
Trade openness (trade) 1.5669*** 1.2707*** 1.7863 1.6339*** 
 
(0.1903) (0.1857) (1.2011) (0.1909) 
Government expenditure (gov_size) -5.1148*** 2.4053 -6.1220*** -17.2293** 
 
(1.2987) (1.4972) (1.3806) (7.6643) 
(Per capita GDP)*(institutional factors) 
 
-0.0058*** 
  
  
(0.0007) 
  
(Trade openness)*(institutional factors) 
  
-0.0244 
 
   
(0.1195) 
 
(Government expenditure)*(institutional factors) 
   
1.1096 
    
(0.7342) 
Middle East/North Africa dummy 0.5699*** -0.1872 0.6391*** 0.7361*** 
 
(0.2212) (0.2595) (0.2272) (0.2307) 
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy 1.1151*** 0.7556*** 1.0957*** 1.0031*** 
 
(0.2158) (0.2205) (0.2172) (0.2301) 
Constant -6.7380*** -7.6759*** -6.6484*** -5.1910*** 
 
(0.3733) (0.3786) (0.8119) (1.2564) 
σt-1
2 0.9321*** 0.9702*** 0.9219*** 0.9288*** 
 
(0.0689) (0.0741) (0.0695) (0.0687) 
σt-2
2 0.0694*** 0.0535** 0.0845*** 0.0855*** 
  (0.0259) (0.0239) (0.0271) (0.0267) 
Log likelihood 2556.996 2567.351 2560.744 2557.812 
Turning point of growth 8.46% 12.80% 8.70% 9.91% 
Number of observations 1575.0000 1575.0000 1575.0000 1575.0000 
Notes: 
1. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
2. The asterisks ***, **, and * are 1%, 5%, and 10% of significance levels, respectively. 
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Table C1 (continued): GS and its volatility (ARCH-M estimation) 
Dependent variable: log(GS) 
Sample period: Government Government Government Government 
1984-2008 Stability Stability Stability Stability 
Independent variables (9) (10) (11) (12) 
GS volatility (σ2) -0.9377*** -0.8712*** -0.9430*** -0.9395*** 
 
(0.2608) (0.2585) (0.2562) (0.2678) 
Per capita GDP growth rate (ggdp) 0.2176*** 0.2135*** 0.2200*** 0.2013*** 
 
(0.0214) (0.0220) (0.0223) (0.0212) 
Age dependency (age_dep) -0.0700*** -0.0824*** -0.0731*** -0.0700*** 
 
(0.0072) (0.0084) (0.0073) (0.0074) 
Urban population rate (urban) -0.1267*** -0.1083*** -0.1283*** -0.1285*** 
 
(0.0040) (0.0055) (0.0038) (0.0041) 
Institutional factors (institution) 0.0022*** 0.0027*** 0.0032*** 0.0042*** 
 
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0009) (0.0010) 
Inflation rate (inflation) -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0001 
 
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0006) 
Trade openness (trade) 0.0425*** 0.0406*** 0.0565*** 0.0418*** 
 
(0.0023) (0.0018) (0.0107) (0.0023) 
Government expenditure (gov_size) 0.1919*** 0.2082*** 0.1960*** 0.2913*** 
 
(0.0181) (0.0173) (0.0181) (0.0537) 
(Per capita GDP)*(institutional factors) 
 
-0.0001*** 
  
  
(0.0000) 
  
(Trade openness)*(institutional factors) 
  
-0.0021 
 
   
(0.0014) 
 
(Government expenditure)*(institutional factors) 
   
-0.0135** 
    
(0.0068) 
Middle East/North Africa dummy 0.0036 0.0026 0.0034 -0.0017 
 
(0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0043) 
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy -0.0700*** -0.0688*** -0.0698*** -0.0709*** 
 
(0.0043) (0.0041) (0.0044) (0.0042) 
Constant 0.1528*** 0.1502*** 0.1483*** 0.1406*** 
  (0.0078) (0.0083) (0.0097) (0.0104) 
Variance equation         
Per capita GDP growth rate (ggdp) -11.2302*** -9.5176*** -11.7508*** -11.3927*** 
 
(1.5265) (1.5018) (1.6340) (1.4317) 
Square of per capita GDP growth rate (ggdp2) 59.2339*** 55.8593*** 59.2096*** 52.7693*** 
 
(8.9930) (9.2978) (6.9881) (9.2096) 
Institutional factors (institution) -0.0704** 0.0158 -0.1958*** 0.1066 
 
(0.0332) (0.0376) (0.0640) (0.0763) 
Inflation rate (inflation) -0.0038 0.0009 -0.0077 0.0144** 
 
(0.0420) (0.0348) (0.0548) (0.0057) 
Trade openness (trade) 1.4704*** 1.1905*** -0.0309 1.4955*** 
 
(0.2197) (0.2316) (0.6740) (0.2264) 
Government expenditure (gov_size) -6.4032*** 0.7262 -6.2764*** 3.8302 
 
(1.2151) (1.4451) (1.2669) (3.5085) 
(Per capita GDP)*(institutional factors) 
 
-0.0072*** 
  
  
(0.0009) 
  
(Trade openness)*(institutional factors) 
  
0.1936** 
 
   
(0.0790) 
 
(Government expenditure)*(institutional factors) 
   
-1.3601*** 
    
(0.4831) 
Middle East/North Africa dummy 0.9221*** 0.1468 0.8338*** 1.0556*** 
 
(0.2184) (0.2675) (0.2499) (0.2331) 
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy 1.2319*** 0.8307*** 1.2456*** 1.1841*** 
 
(0.2457) (0.2493) (0.2437) (0.2460) 
Constant -7.4442*** -8.2461*** -6.5290*** -8.7662*** 
 
(0.2973) (0.3040) (0.5002) (0.5331) 
σt-1
2 0.9395*** 0.9762*** 0.9454*** 0.9221*** 
 
(0.0666) (0.0732) (0.0672) (0.0704) 
σt-2
2 0.0749*** 0.0672*** 0.0781*** 0.0796*** 
  (0.0256) (0.0257) (0.0254) (0.0257) 
Log likelihood 2561.475 2575.601 2562.311 2562.845 
Turning point of growth 9.48% 8.52% 9.92% 10.79% 
Number of observations 1575.0000 1575.0000 1575.0000 1575.0000 
Notes: 
1. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
2. The asterisks ***, **, and * are 1%, 5%, and 10% of significance levels, respectively. 
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Table C1 (continued): GS and its volatility (ARCH-M estimation) 
Dependent variable: log(GS) 
Sample period: Internal Internal Internal Internal 
1984-2008 Conflict Conflict Conflict Conflict 
Independent variables (13) (14) (15) (16) 
GS volatility (σ2) -0.9363*** -0.8236*** -0.9604*** -0.8976*** 
 
(0.2541) (0.2538) (0.2561) (0.2534) 
Per capita GDP growth rate (ggdp) 0.2083*** 0.1965*** 0.2063*** 0.1868*** 
 
(0.0210) (0.0217) (0.0213) (0.0213) 
Age dependency (age_dep) -0.0848*** -0.0939*** -0.0825*** -0.0880*** 
 
(0.0088) (0.0093) (0.0089) (0.0081) 
Urban population rate (urban) -0.1224*** -0.1104*** -0.1239*** -0.1275*** 
 
(0.0046) (0.0055) (0.0046) (0.0046) 
Institutional factors (institution) 0.0009* 0.0014*** 0.0021** 0.0031*** 
 
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0010) 
Inflation rate (inflation) 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 
(0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Trade openness (trade) 0.0429*** 0.0416*** 0.0652*** 0.0440*** 
 
(0.0024) (0.0021) (0.0153) (0.0023) 
Government expenditure (gov_size) 0.1561*** 0.1816*** 0.1647*** 0.2971*** 
 
(0.0187) (0.0199) (0.0189) (0.0636) 
(Per capita GDP)*(institutional factors) 
 
-0.0000*** 
  
  
(0.0000) 
  
(Trade openness)*(institutional factors) 
  
-0.0023 
 
   
(0.0015) 
 
(Government expenditure)*(institutional factors) 
   
-0.0143** 
    
(0.0064) 
Middle East/North Africa dummy 0.0093** 0.0062 0.0075* 0.0053 
 
(0.0041) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) 
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy -0.0633*** -0.0652*** -0.0636*** -0.0645*** 
 
(0.0043) (0.0044) (0.0043) (0.0042) 
Constant 0.1725*** 0.1687*** 0.1593*** 0.1574*** 
  (0.0097) (0.0095) (0.0129) (0.0108) 
Variance equation         
Per capita GDP growth rate (ggdp) -10.7408*** -10.4286*** -11.0644*** -12.5492*** 
 
(1.3344) (1.4722) (1.5315) (1.6725) 
Square of per capita GDP growth rate (ggdp2) 59.9890*** 53.2616*** 63.9279*** 53.7633*** 
 
(8.6018) (9.2489) (6.8295) (9.0891) 
Institutional factors (institution) -0.1196*** -0.0289 -0.1130* -0.0361 
 
(0.0256) (0.0329) (0.0603) (0.0747) 
Inflation rate (inflation) 0.0141** 0.0007 -0.0024 -0.0021 
 
(0.0056) (0.0393) (0.0589) (0.0536) 
Trade openness (trade) 1.5385*** 1.2950*** 1.5972* 1.5381*** 
 
(0.1718) (0.1929) (0.9080) (0.1796) 
Government expenditure (gov_size) -3.3397*** 1.4977 -3.8086*** 1.5316 
 
(1.2213) (1.4938) (1.2808) (4.6891) 
(Per capita GDP)*(institutional factors) 
 
-0.0045*** 
  
  
(0.0007) 
  
(Trade openness)*(institutional factors) 
  
-0.0034 
 
   
(0.0923) 
 
(Government expenditure)*(institutional factors) 
   
-0.5326 
    
(0.4806) 
Middle East/North Africa dummy 0.5179** 0.0108 0.5351** 0.5387** 
 
(0.2084) (0.2470) (0.2112) (0.2099) 
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy 1.0801*** 0.8692*** 1.0969*** 1.0898*** 
 
(0.2237) (0.2220) (0.2261) (0.2293) 
Constant -7.3273*** -8.0901*** -7.3468*** -8.0501*** 
 
(0.2631) (0.2999) (0.5738) (0.6662) 
σt-1
2 0.9380*** 0.9691*** 0.9363*** 0.9466*** 
 
(0.0684) (0.0723) (0.0692) (0.0709) 
σt-2
2 0.0562** 0.0469** 0.0625** 0.0593** 
  (0.0242) (0.0228) (0.0259) (0.0243) 
Log likelihood 2556.832 2566.992 2557.602 2559.448 
Turning point of growth 8.95% 9.79% 8.65% 11.67% 
Number of observations 1575.0000 1575.0000 1575.0000 1575.0000 
Notes: 
1. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
2. The asterisks ***, **, and * are 1%, 5%, and 10% of significance levels, respectively. 
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Table C1 (continued): GS and its volatility (ARCH-M estimation) 
Dependent variable: log(GS) 
Sample period: Investment Investment Investment Investment 
1984-2008 Profile Profile Profile Profile 
Independent variables (17) (18) (19) (20) 
GS volatility (σ2) -0.8586*** -0.8189*** -0.9620*** -0.8997*** 
 
(0.2767) (0.2547) (0.2801) (0.2691) 
Per capita GDP growth rate (ggdp) 0.2407*** 0.2356*** 0.2216*** 0.2354*** 
 
(0.0234) (0.0240) (0.0248) (0.0248) 
Age dependency (age_dep) -0.0887*** -0.0836*** -0.0773*** -0.0866*** 
 
(0.0076) (0.0083) (0.0076) (0.0079) 
Urban population rate (urban) -0.1246*** -0.1219*** -0.1276*** -0.1235*** 
 
(0.0041) (0.0050) (0.0041) (0.0042) 
Institutional factors (institution) 0.0005 0.0003 0.0043*** 0.0016 
 
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0011) 
Inflation rate (inflation) -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 
 
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Trade openness (trade) 0.0363*** 0.0344*** 0.0856*** 0.0375*** 
 
(0.0024) (0.0022) (0.0093) (0.0027) 
Government expenditure (gov_size) 0.1940*** 0.1618*** 0.1927*** 0.2286*** 
 
(0.0191) (0.0194) (0.0188) (0.0506) 
(Per capita GDP)*(institutional factors) 
 
0.0000** 
  
  
(0.0000) 
  
(Trade openness)*(institutional factors) 
  
-0.0053*** 
 
   
(0.0009) 
 
(Government expenditure)*(institutional factors) 
   
-0.0056 
    
(0.0060) 
Middle East/North Africa dummy 0.0074* 0.0091** 0.0007 0.0066 
 
(0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0039) (0.0042) 
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy -0.0616*** -0.0631*** -0.0681*** -0.0634*** 
 
(0.0044) (0.0047) (0.0045) (0.0044) 
Constant 0.1770*** 0.1780*** 0.1410*** 0.1679*** 
  (0.0075) (0.0086) (0.0098) (0.0124) 
Variance equation         
Per capita GDP growth rate (ggdp) -10.4843*** -10.4402*** -10.0914*** -10.1775*** 
 
(1.4818) (1.5717) (1.7541) (1.5386) 
Square of per capita GDP growth rate (ggdp2) 38.9785*** 59.2596*** 60.1553*** 62.1548*** 
 
(10.8552) (9.2748) (9.6562) (9.1540) 
Institutional factors (institution) -0.1061*** -0.0276 -0.2245*** -0.1284 
 
(0.0298) (0.0466) (0.0615) (0.0908) 
Inflation rate (inflation) -0.0027 -0.0010 -0.0095 -0.0054 
 
(0.0355) (0.0406) (0.0506) (0.0436) 
Trade openness (trade) 1.5389*** 1.4973*** 0.5955 1.5092*** 
 
(0.1913) (0.1973) (0.6300) (0.1921) 
Government expenditure (gov_size) -5.8550*** -2.8804** -5.8885*** -6.5712 
 
(1.3247) (1.4245) (1.3811) (4.1201) 
(Per capita GDP)*(institutional factors) 
 
-0.0029*** 
  
  
(0.0009) 
  
(Trade openness)*(institutional factors) 
  
0.1281 
 
   
(0.0781) 
 
(Government expenditure)*(institutional factors) 
   
0.1543 
    
(0.5208) 
Middle East/North Africa dummy 0.7831*** 0.4431* 0.6510** 0.7421*** 
 
(0.2271) (0.2552) (0.2565) (0.2350) 
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy 1.1898*** 1.1441*** 1.2747*** 1.2448*** 
 
(0.2004) (0.1965) (0.2052) (0.2009) 
Constant -7.2244*** -7.9282*** -6.4692*** -7.1427*** 
 
(0.2820) (0.3600) (0.4954) (0.6684) 
σt-1
2 0.9350*** 0.9678*** 0.9221*** 0.9316*** 
 
(0.0706) (0.0731) (0.0725) (0.0723) 
σt-2
2 0.0650** 0.0402 0.0727*** 0.0573** 
  (0.0277) (0.0248) (0.0281) (0.0273) 
Log likelihood 2552.848 2557.896 2563.057 2555.227 
Turning point of growth 13.45% 8.81% 8.39% 8.19% 
Number of observations 1575.0000 1575.0000 1575.0000 1575.0000 
Notes: 
1. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
2. The asterisks ***, **, and * are 1%, 5%, and 10% of significance levels, respectively. 
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Table C1 (continued): GS and its volatility (ARCH-M estimation) 
Dependent variable: log(GS) 
Sample period: Military in Military in Military in Military in 
1984-2008 Politics Politics Politics Politics 
Independent variables (21) (22) (23) (24) 
GS volatility (σ2) -0.8291*** -0.8252*** -1.0064*** -0.8170*** 
 
(0.2548) (0.2553) (0.2720) (0.2696) 
Per capita GDP growth rate (ggdp) 0.2389*** 0.2318*** 0.2281*** 0.2309*** 
 
(0.0225) (0.0236) (0.0222) (0.0226) 
Age dependency (age_dep) -0.0989*** -0.0994*** -0.0843*** -0.0997*** 
 
(0.0092) (0.0095) (0.0091) (0.0092) 
Urban population rate (urban) -0.1145*** -0.1101*** -0.1188*** -0.1137*** 
 
(0.0047) (0.0054) (0.0047) (0.0048) 
Institutional factors (institution) -0.0007 -0.0004 0.0042*** 0.0010 
 
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0013) (0.0014) 
Inflation rate (inflation) -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001 
 
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
Trade openness (trade) 0.0404*** 0.0408*** 0.0882*** 0.0401*** 
 
(0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0098) (0.0024) 
Government expenditure (gov_size) 0.1710*** 0.1872*** 0.1980*** 0.2460*** 
 
(0.0204) (0.0224) (0.0207) (0.0558) 
(Per capita GDP)*(institutional factors) 
 
-0.0000* 
  
  
(0.0000) 
  
(Trade openness)*(institutional factors) 
  
-0.0090*** 
 
   
(0.0019) 
 
(Government expenditure)*(institutional factors) 
   
-0.0149 
    
(0.0106) 
Middle East/North Africa dummy 0.0083* 0.0066 0.0006 0.0041 
 
(0.0044) (0.0045) (0.0043) (0.0047) 
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy -0.0622*** -0.0630*** -0.0671*** -0.0623*** 
 
(0.0043) (0.0045) (0.0043) (0.0044) 
Constant 0.1850*** 0.1816*** 0.1513*** 0.1775*** 
  (0.0086) (0.0087) (0.0104) (0.0105) 
Variance equation         
Per capita GDP growth rate (ggdp) -9.5885*** -9.3772*** -10.3576*** -9.8117*** 
 
(1.4621) (1.4868) (1.7254) (1.4297) 
Square of per capita GDP growth rate (ggdp2) 63.3116*** 59.7017*** 59.5275*** 39.2062*** 
 
(8.8178) (9.0209) (9.5182) (9.6067) 
Institutional factors (institution) -0.3068*** -0.2278*** -0.4608*** -0.1434 
 
(0.0439) (0.0614) (0.1061) (0.1182) 
Inflation rate (inflation) -0.0040 -0.0020 -0.0078 -0.0003 
 
(0.0457) (0.0431) (0.0572) (0.0359) 
Trade openness (trade) 1.5574*** 1.4484*** 0.3957 1.5150*** 
 
(0.1819) (0.1994) (0.6473) (0.1961) 
Government expenditure (gov_size) -0.3141 1.5381 -1.3770 4.5369 
 
(1.3721) (1.5650) (1.4993) (3.3112) 
(Per capita GDP)*(institutional factors) 
 
-0.0040*** 
  
  
(0.0015) 
  
(Trade openness)*(institutional factors) 
  
0.2774** 
 
   
(0.1321) 
 
(Government expenditure)*(institutional factors) 
   
-1.1984* 
    
(0.7128) 
Middle East/North Africa dummy 0.3343 0.0980 0.3301 0.2914 
 
(0.2264) (0.2552) (0.2393) (0.2360) 
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy 0.8905*** 0.8196*** 0.9060*** 0.8702*** 
 
(0.2263) (0.2253) (0.2367) (0.2384) 
Constant -7.6290*** -7.8658*** -6.8880*** -8.1545*** 
 
(0.2430) (0.2682) (0.4766) (0.4506) 
σt-1
2 0.9346*** 0.9410*** 0.9084*** 0.9306*** 
 
(0.0709) (0.0718) (0.0710) (0.0713) 
σt-2
2 0.0493** 0.0480** 0.0823*** 0.0592** 
  (0.0231) (0.0228) (0.0283) (0.0251) 
Log likelihood 2567.173 2568.901 2575.224 2566.155 
Turning point of growth 7.57% 7.85% 8.70% 12.51% 
Number of observations 1575.0000 1575.0000 1575.0000 1575.0000 
Notes: 
1. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
2. The asterisks ***, **, and * are 1%, 5%, and 10% of significance levels, respectively. 
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Table C1 (continued): GS and its volatility (ARCH-M estimation) 
Dependent variable: log(GS) 
Sample period: Religion Religion Religion Religion 
1984-2008 Tension Tension Tension Tension 
Independent variables (25) (26) (27) (28) 
GS volatility (σ2) -0.8746*** -0.8495*** -0.9287*** -0.9157*** 
 
(0.2591) (0.2763) (0.2651) (0.2643) 
Per capita GDP growth rate (ggdp) 0.2354*** 0.2259*** 0.2326*** 0.2519*** 
 
(0.0202) (0.0220) (0.0213) (0.0208) 
Age dependency (age_dep) -0.0808*** -0.0762*** -0.0855*** -0.0794*** 
 
(0.0078) (0.0088) (0.0079) (0.0078) 
Urban population rate (urban) -0.1142*** -0.1240*** -0.1153*** -0.1035*** 
 
(0.0043) (0.0051) (0.0048) (0.0043) 
Institutional factors (institution) 0.0007 0.0004 0.0007 -0.0074*** 
 
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0014) (0.0018) 
Inflation rate (inflation) -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Trade openness (trade) 0.0420*** 0.0398*** 0.0537*** 0.0429*** 
 
(0.0027) (0.0024) (0.0121) (0.0028) 
Government expenditure (gov_size) 0.1781*** 0.1370*** 0.1829*** -0.0858 
 
(0.0188) (0.0193) (0.0187) (0.0558) 
(Per capita GDP)*(institutional factors) 
 
0.0001*** 
  
  
(0.0000) 
  
(Trade openness)*(institutional factors) 
  
-0.0019 
 
   
(0.0024) 
 
(Government expenditure)*(institutional factors) 
   
0.0510*** 
    
(0.0107) 
Middle East/North Africa dummy 0.0090** 0.0123*** 0.0065 0.0172*** 
 
(0.0042) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0044) 
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy -0.0654*** -0.0626*** -0.0611*** -0.0622*** 
 
(0.0042) (0.0047) (0.0042) (0.0045) 
Constant 0.1663*** 0.1725*** 0.1679*** 0.1982*** 
  (0.0081) (0.0083) (0.0099) (0.0102) 
Variance equation         
Per capita GDP growth rate (ggdp) -11.7382*** -11.7192*** -12.2120*** -11.6339*** 
 
(1.3989) (1.3152) (1.4719) (1.4553) 
Square of per capita GDP growth rate (ggdp2) 63.6473*** 30.9533*** 59.3463*** 64.4020*** 
 
(8.7380) (10.2580) (9.0117) (8.7641) 
Institutional factors (institution) -0.2293*** -0.0922* 0.0456 0.0730 
 
(0.0391) (0.0516) (0.0991) (0.1201) 
Inflation rate (inflation) -0.0019 0.0015 -0.0018 -0.0017 
 
(0.0388) (0.0336) (0.0389) (0.0445) 
Trade openness (trade) 1.4744*** 1.4505*** 3.7280*** 1.1966*** 
 
(0.1767) (0.1726) (0.5981) (0.1758) 
Government expenditure (gov_size) -4.9521*** -1.2332 -5.7349*** 3.5851 
 
(1.1950) (1.4348) (1.2639) (3.4600) 
(Per capita GDP)*(institutional factors) 
 
-0.0086*** 
  
  
(0.0015) 
  
(Trade openness)*(institutional factors) 
  
-0.4959*** 
 
   
(0.1298) 
 
(Government expenditure)*(institutional factors) 
   
-1.9548*** 
    
(0.7110) 
Middle East/North Africa dummy 0.3339 0.0085 0.1654 0.2040 
 
(0.2156) (0.2600) (0.2110) (0.2598) 
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy 1.2353*** 0.8830*** 1.2428*** 1.2117*** 
 
(0.2042) (0.2031) (0.2063) (0.2038) 
Constant -7.0620*** -7.5974*** -8.1476*** -8.1835*** 
 
(0.2918) (0.3374) (0.4709) (0.5678) 
σt-1
2 0.9322*** 0.9346*** 0.9154*** 0.9216*** 
 
(0.0686) (0.0729) (0.0691) (0.0725) 
σt-2
2 0.0655** 0.0632** 0.0774*** 0.0772*** 
  (0.0272) (0.0268) (0.0275) (0.0295) 
Log likelihood 2559.244 2569.631 2562.881 2569.333 
Turning point of growth 9.22% 18.93% 10.29% 9.03% 
Number of observations 1575.0000 1575.0000 1575.0000 1575.0000 
Notes: 
1. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
2. The asterisks ***, **, and * are 1%, 5%, and 10% of significance levels, respectively. 
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Table C1 (continued): GS and its volatility (ARCH-M estimation) 
Dependent variable: log(GS) 
Sample period: Socio-economic Socio-economic Socio-economic Socio-economic 
1984-2008 Condition Condition Condition Condition 
Independent variables (29) (30) (31) (32) 
GS volatility (σ2) -0.8020*** -0.8135*** -1.0271*** -0.8665*** 
 
(0.2762) (0.2626) (0.2928) (0.2886) 
Per capita GDP growth rate (ggdp) 0.2401*** 0.2236*** 0.2415*** 0.2275*** 
 
(0.0212) (0.0240) (0.0254) (0.0220) 
Age dependency (age_dep) -0.0760*** -0.0820*** -0.0664*** -0.0740*** 
 
(0.0074) (0.0078) (0.0078) (0.0076) 
Urban population rate (urban) -0.1195*** -0.1110*** -0.1146*** -0.1202*** 
 
(0.0041) (0.0047) (0.0046) (0.0043) 
Institutional factors (institution) 0.0023*** 0.0032*** 0.0071*** 0.0063*** 
 
(0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0012) 
Inflation rate (inflation) -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0002 
 
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Trade openness (trade) 0.0382*** 0.0396*** 0.0980*** 0.0418*** 
 
(0.0020) (0.0022) (0.0090) (0.0022) 
Government expenditure (gov_size) 0.1587*** 0.1817*** 0.1716*** 0.3200*** 
 
(0.0181) (0.0195) (0.0192) (0.0532) 
(Per capita GDP)*(institutional factors) 
 
-0.0000*** 
  
  
(0.0000) 
  
(Trade openness)*(institutional factors) 
  
-0.0075*** 
 
   
(0.0011) 
 
(Government expenditure)*(institutional factors) 
   
-0.0239*** 
    
(0.0071) 
Middle East/North Africa dummy 0.0099*** 0.0069* 0.0062 0.0070* 
 
(0.0038) (0.0039) (0.0038) (0.0040) 
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy -0.0622*** -0.0632*** -0.0650*** -0.0605*** 
 
(0.0044) (0.0046) (0.0045) (0.0044) 
Constant 0.1578*** 0.1516*** 0.1108*** 0.1298*** 
  (0.0074) (0.0078) (0.0098) (0.0116) 
Variance equation         
Per capita GDP growth rate (ggdp) -10.8599*** -10.3409*** -9.6806*** -11.6046*** 
 
(1.4884) (1.5771) (1.6497) (1.5303) 
Square of per capita GDP growth rate (ggdp2) 31.4846** 55.3362*** 54.6326*** 26.6928* 
 
(13.8695) (9.2110) (10.9304) (14.7412) 
Institutional factors (institution) -0.2618*** -0.2285*** -0.3201*** -0.1964** 
 
(0.0366) (0.0561) (0.0767) (0.0992) 
Inflation rate (inflation) -0.0052 -0.0075 -0.0118 -0.0048 
 
(0.0421) (0.0487) (0.0521) (0.0405) 
Trade openness (trade) 1.4183*** 1.2652*** 0.7218 1.3843*** 
 
(0.1816) (0.1769) (0.5872) (0.1755) 
Government expenditure (gov_size) -2.0999 -1.3560 -2.3985 0.7503 
 
(1.5820) (1.7316) (1.6327) (3.8335) 
(Per capita GDP)*(institutional factors) 
 
-0.0011 
  
  
(0.0011) 
  
(Trade openness)*(institutional factors) 
  
0.0541 
 
   
(0.1062) 
 
(Government expenditure)*(institutional factors) 
   
-0.4579 
    
(0.6042) 
Middle East/North Africa dummy 0.4265 0.3695 0.4544* 0.4012 
 
(0.2596) (0.2731) (0.2697) (0.2626) 
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy 1.0783*** 1.0707*** 1.1198*** 1.0629*** 
 
(0.1630) (0.1729) (0.1625) (0.1622) 
Constant -6.8847*** -7.0250*** -6.4064*** -7.2293*** 
 
(0.2733) (0.3549) (0.4613) (0.5590) 
σt-1
2 0.9236*** 0.9334*** 0.8848*** 0.9028*** 
 
(0.0695) (0.0691) (0.0690) (0.0700) 
σt-2
2 0.0600** 0.0501** 0.1045*** 0.0753*** 
  (0.0255) (0.0243) (0.0308) (0.0268) 
Log likelihood 2574.922 2577.018 2585.425 2578.405 
Turning point of growth 17.25% 9.34% 8.86% 21.74% 
Number of observations 1575.0000 1575.0000 1575.0000 1575.0000 
Notes: 
1. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
2. The asterisks ***, **, and * are 1%, 5%, and 10% of significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 1:  Correlation of institution variables 
  Bureaucracy Corruption Democratic Ethnic External  Government Internal Investment Law and Military in Religious Socio-economic 
  Quality   Accountability Tension Conflict Stability Conflict Profile Order Politics Tension Condition 
Bureaucracy Quality 1.0000             
Corruption 0.7194  1.0000            
Democratic Accountability 0.6724  0.6168  1.0000           
Ethnic Tension 0.3369  0.4134  0.3320  1.0000          
External Conflict 0.3565  0.3504  0.4315  0.4444  1.0000         
Government Stability 0.2579  0.1453  0.1694  0.2826  0.2900  1.0000        
Internal Conflict 0.5322  0.5120  0.4994  0.6942  0.6172  0.4101  1.0000       
Investment Profile 0.4531  0.2428  0.4511  0.2821  0.3236  0.5744  0.4184  1.0000      
Law and Order 0.7217  0.7054  0.5297  0.5606  0.4739  0.3662  0.7298  0.4328  1.0000     
Military in Politics 0.7145  0.6761  0.6938  0.4980  0.4630  0.2116  0.6581  0.4713  0.6834  1.0000    
Religious Tension 0.2932  0.4178  0.3936  0.4743  0.4234  0.1159  0.5344  0.2590  0.3788  0.4743  1.0000   
Socio-economic Condition 0.6238  0.5256  0.4284  0.3747  0.2678  0.2419  0.4518  0.5579  0.6202  0.5329  0.3500  1.0000  
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Table 2: GS and its volatility (ARCH-M estimation) 
Dependent variable: log(GS) 
Sample period: Bureaucratic Bureaucratic Bureaucratic Bureaucratic 
1984-2008 Quality Quality Quality Quality 
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
GS volatility (σ2) -1.0095*** -1.0845*** -1.1930*** -0.9938*** 
 
(0.2488) (0.2974) (0.2614) (0.2674) 
Per capita GDP growth rate (ggdp) 0.2002*** 0.2227*** 0.2010*** 0.2086*** 
 
(0.0222) (0.0224) (0.0221) (0.0236) 
Age dependency (age_dep) -0.0341*** -0.0433*** -0.0192*** -0.0337*** 
 
(0.0072) (0.0086) (0.0069) (0.0077) 
Urban population rate (urban) -0.1004*** -0.0988*** -0.0981*** -0.1023*** 
 
(0.0041) (0.0042) (0.0039) (0.0042) 
Institutional factors (institution) 0.0148*** 0.0215*** 0.0245*** 0.0206*** 
 
(0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0019) 
Inflation rate (inflation) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 -0.0011*** 
 
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0002) 
Trade openness (trade) 0.0393*** 0.0452*** 0.0918*** 0.0380*** 
 
(0.0017) (0.0020) (0.0065) (0.0018) 
Government expenditure (gov_size) -0.0180 0.0326* -0.0089 0.1014** 
 
(0.0182) (0.0191) (0.0175) (0.0420) 
(Per capita GDP)*(institutional factors) 
 
-0.0003*** 
  
  
(0.0000) 
  
(Trade openness)*(institutional factors) 
  
-0.0153*** 
 
   
(0.0019) 
 
(Government expenditure)*(institutional factors) 
   
-0.0366*** 
    
(0.0122) 
Middle East/North Africa dummy 0.0109*** 0.0059 0.0084** 0.0084** 
 
(0.0033) (0.0041) (0.0036) (0.0036) 
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy -0.0667*** -0.0698*** -0.0682*** -0.0674*** 
 
(0.0042) (0.0043) (0.0041) (0.0043) 
Constant 0.1284*** 0.1166*** 0.0860*** 0.1135*** 
  (0.0066) (0.0072) (0.0080) (0.0088) 
Variance equation         
Per capita GDP growth rate (ggdp) -12.1057*** -11.5626*** -12.3864*** -11.7968*** 
 
(1.4123) (1.3006) (1.4368) (1.4569) 
Square of per capita GDP growth rate (ggdp2) 57.0954*** 26.4317** 56.6545*** 48.5452*** 
 
(7.1384) (10.7384) (6.9797) (10.4018) 
Institutional factors (institution) -0.2066** -0.1239 -0.1625 -0.0007 
 
(0.0871) (0.0968) (0.1403) (0.1530) 
Inflation rate (inflation) 0.0041 0.0046 0.0073 0.0056 
 
(0.0194) (0.0196) (0.0124) (0.0294) 
Trade openness (trade) 1.0054*** 0.8716*** 0.9225* 0.9413*** 
 
(0.1838) (0.2209) (0.5268) (0.1890) 
Government expenditure (gov_size) -6.2145*** -3.2223* -7.9145*** -0.8537 
 
(1.7834) (1.8076) (1.8241) (3.7964) 
(Per capita GDP)*(institutional factors) 
 
-0.0060** 
  
  
(0.0024) 
  
(Trade openness)*(institutional factors) 
  
-0.0100 
 
   
(0.1693) 
 
(Government expenditure)*(institutional factors) 
   
-1.8505* 
    
(1.0985) 
Middle East/North Africa dummy 0.9179*** 0.6202** 0.9430*** 0.8233** 
 
(0.3003) (0.3085) (0.3197) (0.3274) 
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy 1.1018*** 0.8886*** 1.2354*** 1.0485*** 
 
(0.1874) (0.1931) (0.1838) (0.1931) 
Constant -7.2207*** -7.4136*** -7.1488*** -7.7104*** 
 
(0.2095) (0.2283) (0.3280) (0.3910) 
σt-1
2 0.9441*** 0.8960*** 0.9360*** 0.9391*** 
 
(0.0659) (0.0658) (0.0643) (0.0666) 
σt-2
2 0.0811*** 0.1168*** 0.1169*** 0.0880*** 
  (0.0232) (0.0279) (0.0268) (0.0247) 
Log likelihood 2586.251 2602.608 2605.525 2586.448 
Turning point of growth 10.60% 21.87% 10.93% 12.15% 
Number of observations 1575.0000 1575.0000 1575.0000 1575.0000 
Notes: 
1. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
2. The asterisks ***, **, and * are 1%, 5%, and 10% of significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 2 (continued): GS and its volatility (ARCH-M estimation) 
Dependent variable: log(GS) 
Sample period: Corruption Corruption Corruption Corruption 
1984-2008 
    
Independent variables (5) (6) (7) (8) 
GS volatility (σ2) -0.7947*** -0.6757*** -0.9245*** -0.6829*** 
 
(0.2337) (0.2475) (0.2409) (0.2472) 
Per capita GDP growth rate (ggdp) 0.2329*** 0.2158*** 0.2209*** 0.2366*** 
 
(0.0202) (0.0222) (0.0204) (0.0201) 
Age dependency (age_dep) -0.0856*** -0.0853*** -0.0795*** -0.0879*** 
 
(0.0084) (0.0089) (0.0087) (0.0086) 
Urban population rate (urban) -0.1137*** -0.1072*** -0.1155*** -0.1135*** 
 
(0.0039) (0.0050) (0.0041) (0.0040) 
Institutional factors (institution) 0.0033*** 0.0048*** 0.0060*** 0.0012 
 
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0015) (0.0016) 
Inflation rate (inflation) -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0004** -0.0001 
 
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
Trade openness (trade) 0.0385*** 0.0412*** 0.0629*** 0.0367*** 
 
(0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0088) (0.0022) 
Government expenditure (gov_size) 0.1219*** 0.1362*** 0.1395*** 0.0357 
 
(0.0196) (0.0222) (0.0214) (0.0432) 
(Per capita GDP)*(institutional factors) 
 
-0.0001*** 
  
  
(0.0000) 
  
(Trade openness)*(institutional factors) 
  
-0.0053*** 
 
   
(0.0021) 
 
(Government expenditure)*(institutional factors) 
   
0.0179** 
    
(0.0089) 
Middle East/North Africa dummy 0.0154*** 0.0106** 0.0110*** 0.0189*** 
 
(0.0040) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0041) 
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy -0.0544*** -0.0601*** -0.0569*** -0.0537*** 
 
(0.0043) (0.0045) (0.0043) (0.0043) 
Constant 0.1683*** 0.1610*** 0.1523*** 0.1800*** 
  (0.0074) (0.0078) (0.0100) (0.0099) 
Variance equation         
Per capita GDP growth rate (ggdp) -10.7823*** -9.8533*** -11.1450*** -10.6968*** 
 
(1.3674) (1.3396) (1.3508) (1.3434) 
Square of per capita GDP growth rate (ggdp2) 61.8716*** 35.2312*** 64.3651*** 42.1620*** 
 
(8.7983) (10.1920) (6.2948) (9.6638) 
Institutional factors (institution) -0.4073*** -0.1897*** -0.5808*** -0.1811 
 
(0.0561) (0.0615) (0.1165) (0.1189) 
Inflation rate (inflation) -0.0074 0.0012 -0.0172 -0.0007 
 
(0.0461) (0.0306) (0.0457) (0.0378) 
Trade openness (trade) 1.3148*** 1.2092*** 0.4743 1.2837*** 
 
(0.1821) (0.2004) (0.5496) (0.1936) 
Government expenditure (gov_size) 0.2496 3.6264** 0.0223 3.7953 
 
(1.4811) (1.7557) (1.4573) (3.0133) 
(Per capita GDP)*(institutional factors) 
 
-0.0100*** 
  
  
(0.0017) 
  
(Trade openness)*(institutional factors) 
  
0.2717** 
 
   
(0.1385) 
 
(Government expenditure)*(institutional factors) 
   
-1.3468** 
    
(0.6627) 
Middle East/North Africa dummy 0.1863 -0.2324 0.1793 0.1796 
 
(0.2556) (0.2907) (0.2474) (0.2643) 
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy 0.8663*** 0.6475*** 0.8360*** 0.8131*** 
 
(0.2347) (0.2354) (0.2387) (0.2413) 
Constant -7.3646*** -7.9549*** -6.7879*** -7.8775*** 
 
(0.2431) (0.2564) (0.3985) (0.4067) 
σt-1
2 0.9650*** 0.9716*** 0.9469*** 0.9622*** 
 
(0.0678) (0.0691) (0.0687) (0.0692) 
σt-2
2 0.0246 0.0361* 0.0351 0.0368* 
  (0.0170) (0.0199) (0.0221) (0.0221) 
Log likelihood 2569.994 2573.94 2572.468 2568.896 
Turning point of growth 8.71% 13.98% 8.66% 12.69% 
Number of observations 1575.0000 1575.0000 1575.0000 1575.0000 
Notes: 
1. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
2. The asterisks ***, **, and * are 1%, 5%, and 10% of significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 2 (continued): GS and its volatility (ARCH-M estimation) 
Dependent variable: log(GS) 
Sample period: Democratic Democratic Democratic Democratic 
1984-2008 Accountability Accountability Accountability Accountability 
Independent variables (9) (10) (11) (12) 
GS volatility (σ2) -0.7988*** -0.8140*** -0.8486*** -0.6972*** 
 
(0.2354) (0.2419) (0.2384) (0.2441) 
Per capita GDP growth rate (ggdp) 0.1582*** 0.1864*** 0.1593*** 0.1595*** 
 
(0.0212) (0.0221) (0.0215) (0.0202) 
Age dependency (age_dep) -0.0540*** -0.0703*** -0.0475*** -0.0569*** 
 
(0.0072) (0.0087) (0.0076) (0.0071) 
Urban population rate (urban) -0.1131*** -0.1123*** -0.1134*** -0.1127*** 
 
(0.0037) (0.0050) (0.0037) (0.0036) 
Institutional factors (institution) 0.0072*** 0.0071*** 0.0096*** 0.0040*** 
 
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0014) (0.0015) 
Inflation rate (inflation) -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Trade openness (trade) 0.0465*** 0.0447*** 0.0673*** 0.0463*** 
 
(0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0111) (0.0020) 
Government expenditure (gov_size) 0.0803*** 0.1191*** 0.0884*** -0.0687 
 
(0.0175) (0.0188) (0.0180) (0.0540) 
(Per capita GDP)*(institutional factors) 
 
-0.0001*** 
  
  
(0.0000) 
  
(Trade openness)*(institutional factors) 
  
-0.0039* 
 
   
(0.0020) 
 
(Government expenditure)*(institutional factors) 
   
0.0268*** 
    
(0.0102) 
Middle East/North Africa dummy 0.0131*** 0.0144*** 0.0117*** 0.0163*** 
 
(0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0041) (0.0041) 
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy -0.0635*** -0.0613*** -0.0624*** -0.0642*** 
 
(0.0036) (0.0038) (0.0036) (0.0037) 
Constant 0.1326*** 0.1407*** 0.1158*** 0.1514*** 
  (0.0066) (0.0080) (0.0104) (0.0098) 
Variance equation         
Per capita GDP growth rate (ggdp) -11.2246*** -10.4754*** -11.5865*** -12.2896*** 
 
(1.5099) (1.4924) (1.5941) (1.4802) 
Square of per capita GDP growth rate (ggdp2) 54.2254*** 51.3985*** 52.9146*** 31.1090** 
 
(9.4590) (9.9130) (9.5697) (12.6309) 
Institutional factors (institution) -0.3585*** -0.2610*** -0.3853*** -0.3290** 
 
(0.0641) (0.0650) (0.1195) (0.1382) 
Inflation rate (inflation) -0.0000 0.0008 -0.0001 0.0007 
 
(0.0432) (0.0401) (0.0460) (0.0364) 
Trade openness (trade) 1.3582*** 1.3200*** 0.9465 1.4252*** 
 
(0.1903) (0.1975) (0.7488) (0.1972) 
Government expenditure (gov_size) -1.1285 1.4230 -1.8955 -2.5742 
 
(1.5732) (1.6549) (1.6212) (4.4807) 
(Per capita GDP)*(institutional factors) 
 
-0.0052*** 
  
  
(0.0012) 
  
(Trade openness)*(institutional factors) 
  
0.0793 
 
   
(0.1454) 
 
(Government expenditure)*(institutional factors) 
   
0.0634 
    
(0.8687) 
Middle East/North Africa dummy 0.1954 -0.0997 0.2832 0.2849 
 
(0.2634) (0.2756) (0.2939) (0.2931) 
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy 0.7247*** 0.6311** 0.6959*** 0.6881** 
 
(0.2554) (0.2493) (0.2650) (0.2734) 
Constant -7.0228*** -7.4025*** -6.7813*** -7.0071*** 
 
(0.2562) (0.2721) (0.5148) (0.5963) 
σt-1
2 0.9794*** 0.9701*** 0.9696*** 0.9907*** 
 
(0.0685) (0.0709) (0.0704) (0.0697) 
σt-2
2 0.0290 0.0288 0.0472** 0.0384* 
  (0.0213) (0.0230) (0.0230) (0.0214) 
Log likelihood 2568.169 2571.747 2569.431 2567.721 
Turning point of growth 10.35% 10.19% 10.95% 19.75% 
Number of observations 1575.0000 1575.0000 1575.0000 1575.0000 
Notes: 
1. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
2. The asterisks ***, **, and * are 1%, 5%, and 10% of significance levels, respectively. 
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Table 2 (continued): GS and its volatility (ARCH-M estimation) 
Dependent variable: log(GS) 
Sample period: Law and Law and Law and Law and 
1984-2008 Order Order Order Order 
Independent variables (13) (14) (15) (16) 
GS volatility (σ2) -0.6869*** -0.6748*** -0.8522*** -0.7344*** 
 
(0.2507) (0.2536) (0.2712) (0.2295) 
Per capita GDP growth rate (ggdp) 0.2184*** 0.2005*** 0.1869*** 0.2062*** 
 
(0.0197) (0.0208) (0.0211) (0.0203) 
Age dependency (age_dep) -0.0676*** -0.0723*** -0.0535*** -0.0648*** 
 
(0.0084) (0.0091) (0.0083) (0.0084) 
Urban population rate (urban) -0.1175*** -0.1114*** -0.1122*** -0.1175*** 
 
(0.0041) (0.0050) (0.0042) (0.0042) 
Institutional factors (institution) 0.0037*** 0.0058*** 0.0085*** 0.0054*** 
 
(0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0017) 
Inflation rate (inflation) -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Trade openness (trade) 0.0392*** 0.0419*** 0.0781*** 0.0397*** 
 
(0.0022) (0.0020) (0.0076) (0.0023) 
Government expenditure (gov_size) 0.1314*** 0.1658*** 0.1277*** 0.1755*** 
 
(0.0191) (0.0196) (0.0202) (0.0470) 
(Per capita GDP)*(institutional factors) 
 
-0.0001*** 
  
  
(0.0000) 
  
(Trade openness)*(institutional factors) 
  
-0.0077*** 
 
   
(0.0015) 
 
(Government expenditure)*(institutional factors) 
   
-0.0101 
    
(0.0101) 
Middle East/North Africa dummy 0.0077* 0.0038 0.0029 0.0059 
 
(0.0040) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0041) 
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy -0.0641*** -0.0655*** -0.0678*** -0.0652*** 
 
(0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0046) 
Constant 0.1564*** 0.1476*** 0.1242*** 0.1483*** 
  (0.0076) (0.0086) (0.0089) (0.0106) 
Variance equation         
Per capita GDP growth rate (ggdp) -10.5614*** -10.5179*** -10.3832*** -11.1770*** 
 
(1.3169) (1.3502) (1.3962) (1.4312) 
Square of per capita GDP growth rate (ggdp2) 36.4855*** 32.9940*** 37.6185*** 55.4063*** 
 
(12.1188) (11.3850) (10.6327) (9.3069) 
Institutional factors (institution) -0.2780*** -0.0969 -0.2190** -0.1294 
 
(0.0534) (0.0685) (0.1059) (0.1350) 
Inflation rate (inflation) -0.0019 0.0014 -0.0007 -0.0027 
 
(0.0433) (0.0320) (0.0386) (0.0543) 
Trade openness (trade) 1.3922*** 1.2319*** 1.4119** 1.3708*** 
 
(0.1732) (0.2026) (0.6142) (0.1771) 
Government expenditure (gov_size) -1.4190 1.2015 -2.9324* 2.4713 
 
(1.5088) (1.6251) (1.5925) (3.1683) 
(Per capita GDP)*(institutional factors) 
 
-0.0072*** 
  
  
(0.0015) 
  
(Trade openness)*(institutional factors) 
  
-0.0352 
 
   
(0.1464) 
 
(Government expenditure)*(institutional factors) 
   
-0.9158 
    
(0.7640) 
Middle East/North Africa dummy 0.5284** 0.2392 0.6406*** 0.4576* 
 
(0.2471) (0.2637) (0.2440) (0.2398) 
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy 1.0064*** 0.8859*** 1.0089*** 1.0977*** 
 
(0.2316) (0.2361) (0.2310) (0.2168) 
Constant -7.4486*** -7.9929*** -7.4336*** -8.0310*** 
 
(0.2474) (0.2575) (0.3891) (0.4621) 
σt-1
2 0.9632*** 0.9805*** 0.9460*** 0.9821*** 
 
(0.0697) (0.0716) (0.0704) (0.0708) 
σt-2
2 0.0303 0.0348 0.0573** 0.0106 
  (0.0227) (0.0216) (0.0263) (0.0207) 
Log likelihood 2564.962 2572.066 2570.38 2568.339 
Turning point of growth 14.47% 15.94% 13.80% 10.09% 
Number of observations 1575.0000 1575.0000 1575.0000 1575.0000 
Notes: 
1. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
2. The asterisks ***, **, and * are 1%, 5%, and 10% of significance levels, respectively. 
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Figure 1: The different shapes of GS paths 
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Figure 2: The relationship between institutions and sustainability 
 
 
 
Institution SD
Volatility
β3 >0
κ >0 β1 <0
